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Most related researches about liner shipping alliance are outdate and only 
concentrate on the theory but lack of real data to support. Besides, laws can also 
restrict the shipping market. Market shares of liner shipping companies can affect 
other companies in different countries, so countries will create related rules and 
regulations to restrict the power from foreign companies and protect their interest. 
The dissertation is purposed to through the development of international container 
transportation strategic alliance and to analyse the main structure of the alliance, to 
find the reason why the shipping companies would likely to form the alliance. 
Although shipping alliance has made a success in the shipping companies, many 
countries have different feelings to them. They establish related policies to restrict 
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1 Research Proposal 
1.1 Background  
Shipping industry is the derivative of trade. The development of shipping is related 
to the situation of the trade. Due to the world economic and political situation is 
complex and changeable in 2016; UK-based Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
forecasts the growth of global GDP will be 3.4%. Continued stagnation in developed 
economies could further anti trade sentiment. The U.S. economy will grow by 2.2% 
in 2017-18. The weak recovery of the European economy will be strengthened, 
despite the influence of Brexit. In Asia, Japan's annual economic growth rate will be 
0.7% during 2017-2021. China economy is expected to grow by 6.2% in 2017, down 
to 4.2% in 2018. India economic growth will reach 6.8% in 2017. Brazil economy 
will return to positive growth in 2017, but the growth rate is very low, only 0.5%. 
BIMCO expects the container ship capacity will increase 3.1%, higher than 1.1% in 
last year. BIMCO says that if the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecast global 
GDP growth of 3.4% in 2017 to become a reality, the container market will be 
neither improved nor worsen. (WTO, 2016) 
Due to the slowdown of global trade, the demand of containers also slows. Demand-
side pressures have presented a key challenge to the containership sector in recent 
times, with container trade growth slowing to just 2.2% in 2015 (1.5% in TEU-mile 
terms). It appears that on the demand side, the bottom of the cycle has now been 
passed and expansion in box trade has picked up this year, with volumes projected to  
increase by 3.3% to 180.9m TEU. However, this is still a relatively moderate rate of 
growth, with a number of pressures still being felt on some trade routes. (Clarksons, 
2016) 
There are several modern characters of the international liner market in the newly 
economic and trade pattern. (1) Because of the imbalance of supply and demand, the 
surplus capacity is still high. With demand growing more quickly than supply, the 
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global supply/demand index is expected to reach 82.1 points by end 2016, 
representing some year to year improvement, and a change in direction from 2015. A 
further increase to 82.2 points is expected by end 2017. However, the containership 
sector is still subject to a significant degree of pressure from surplus capacity and the 
key fundamental driver of the continued pressure on the container shipping markets 
in recent times has been the slower pace of demand growth, against the background 
of the surplus capacity that built up in the sector through the global economic 
downturn. (2) Liner shipping companies tend to use cost control system to reduce the 
operation cost. However, the container freight continued to slide over the reduced 
cost. Many shipping companies experienced huge loss in 2016. Even A.P. Moller - 
Maersk A/S suffered 1.9 billion profit losses in liner shipping service. It is 
noteworthy that Maersk hasn‟t suffered a loss from 2009. (3) With the further 
integration of shipping resources, the pattern of the shipping alliance will change 
significantly. The liner shipping companies tend to build alliance, merger and asset 
reorganization under the depressive shipping market and fierce competence situation, 
which makes the Concentration Ratio continuously improve. In the top 10 liner 
shipping companies, CMA-CGM acquired the NOL, APL, COSCO and China 
Shipping merged together, Hapag-Lloyd and UASC negotiated to be merged. The 
old alliance G6, O3 and CKYHE disappeared.  The CKYHE may change to KYE, 
and HMM say they reached a cooperation agreement with 2M alliance. The new 
alliances are 2M, OCEAN Alliance and THE Alliance. (4) Shipping companies 
endures pressure from environment protection and their transportation cost will be 
higher. Shipping companies take clean oil to reduce the pollution, but the cost may 
add to $50-150/ FEU. With the expansion of the emission control area, liner shipping 
companies should pay the high oil cost and the shipping market is more challenging.  
(SISI, 2016) 
Weak freight rates continued to impact liner company performance, with the high-
profile collapse of Hanjin Shipping in late August, previously the eighth largest 
containership operator, testament to the challenging conditions. While the pace of 
containership fleet growth has slowed markedly this year, the continued delivery of 
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very large containerships continues to present challenges to liner companies 
regarding the management of capacity. The changing alliances present the weak and 
low-responding enterprises will be eliminated, shipping resources are accelerated 
concentration, which will help to recover the freight and raise the profit ability of 
liner shipping companies. 
 
1.2 Purpose of research 
This dissertation is purposed to through the development of international container 
transportation strategic alliance and to analyse the main structure of the alliance, to 
find the reason why the shipping companies would likely to form the alliance. 
Besides, do the research on the impact of the shipping alliance to the market and 
forecast the future of the liner shipping market. Although shipping alliance has made 
a success in the shipping companies, many countries have different feelings to them. 
They establish related policies to restrict their power. The potential reason should be 
explored. 
With the change of time, shipping companies have been changing their strategy to 
face the competence from each other. For example, shipping companies make the 
container ship bigger and bigger, which is based on the theory of scales economy. 
The other trend between the shipping companies is to establish the shipping alliance. 
Strategic alliance originated from the Japanese corporation under the trend of 
creating joint venture. The concept of the strategic alliance is presented by J.Hopland, 
the president of the DEC, and the management scientist R.Nigel, which has caused 
wide public concern in the field of management and business. There is no uniform 
definition of strategic alliance in the academic field. The general and accepted 
definition is: strategic alliance is a loose network organization with complementary 
advantages, risk sharing, horizontal elements between two and more firms which 
want to share the same market and source through different types of agreement and 
contract. (Xu, Zhang, & Xu, 2006) 
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From 1990s, the contradictions of supply and demand have been growing in liner 
shipping industry. Shipping market has entered an unprecedented difficult period. 
Although the liner shipping companies try their best to add investment and 
corporation in route collocation, price policy and service level, practice shows 
minority of one cannot offer a good service with a low cost. From the beginning of 
containerization, the container shipping companies have engaged in enterprise 
cooperation. The cooperation experienced several form such as: Liner Conference, 
Consortia, Stabilization Agreement and Strategic Alliance during the last years.  
To analyse the structure and strategy of shipping alliance, I will start from the 
influence of world economy and trade, which affect the trend of shipping industry. 
As far as we know, shipping is a derivative of trade. Shipping develops cannot 
without the prosperous trade. Explore the strategy of main line shipping company to 
face the challenges brought by continued economic downturn. Liner shipping 
companies tend to charter the space each other. Besides, the liner shipping 
companies update container ships to raise their competitiveness, which will add 
operation cost. So, the situation urges liner shipping companies to establish the 
strategic alliance to meet the competence. Due to various kinds of operation strategy 
and business situation in shipping companies, the strategic alliances remain changing. 
The alliances are dynamic and never stop.    
 
 
1.3 Research methodology   
To achieve the research purposes, next chapter will review the literature related to 
the subject of the shipping alliance and shipping market analysis, which can help me 
to analyse the structure of shipping alliance and strategy. In chapter3, I will introduce 
the history of the shipping alliance, some main form of the alliance and analyse some 
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forming factors in economic theory. In chapter4, I will disp lay the market share of 
the different shipping alliance in 3 main liner routes and calculate the Concentration 
Ratio, which will affect the shipping alliance strategy. In chapter5, Policy could also 
influence the power of shipping alliance, some related laws are displayed. Finally, 
the general conclusion of the research will be written in chapter6. 
The main methods used in this dissertation are Comparative analysis and Literature 
analysis. 
By doing so the dissertation explores relation between the company‟s strategy and 
service network, and to hypothesis the alliance development. Relevant service data 
will be obtained from “sin.clarkson.net” and “alphaliner.com”. Data related shipping 
companies will be retrieved their websites. The existing literature does not keep pace 
of stage, and it is meaningful to update the relevant research. 
1.4 Schedule  
Working plan Date  
Literature searching 7/2/2017-5/3/2017 
Export‟s suggestion 28/2/2017-11/3/2017 
Dissertation proposal 12/3/2017-5/4/2017 
Revision of proposal 6/4/2017-19/4/2017 
Submit proposal 20/4/2017 
Composition and amendment 20/4/2017-13/5/2017 
First draft 26/5/2017 
Second draft 16/6/2017 
Third draft 6/7/2017 
Final revision 9/7/2017-19/7/2017 
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2 Literature review 
The objective of literature review is to review the related papers and articles to the 
topic of strategic alliance in liner shipping industry, economics, trade, laws and 
Concentration Ratio.  
2.1 Research on shipping strategic alliance 
Xu T. Zhang S. and Xu G. (2006) researched the main form of liner shipping alliance 
structure and development to explore the deep reason of the alliance.  Authors 
displayed the history and development of the shipping alliance and held several 
examples of alliance. Shipping alliance is connected to shipping industry and 
analyses the business strategy. Authors thought due to the development of 
international trade, shipping lines changed to more intensive. The carrier wanted to 
get scales economy, so the ship size became bigger and bigger. Through the alliance 
strategy and optimization network, number of call ports would be added and service 
could be better. Enterprise made the scale operation but they also were independent 
to each other and had a fierce competence. (Xu, Zhang, & Xu, 2006) 
Jiang (2014) researched the shipping alliance could affect the port operation. The 
result of the shipping alliance is the activity of movement of market capacity. Carrier 
wanted to reduce the scale of capacity and risk. Shipping alliance could exchange the 
capacity at the target route and reallocated the over source. The potential reason of 
alliance is the game and concurrence of economy. However, the change of source 
could influence the port. After the forming of shipping alliance, they all purposed the 
big vessel strategy. Port lost their advantage occupation because they negotiated with 
a lot of liner shipping companies at the same time not only one. The change of 
shipping alliance would coordinate the network in the world. The cluster would be 
multilevel. The hub port may change even disappear but other small port may 
become a huge port which can accept big vessels. (Jiang L. , 2014) 
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Chen (2012) analysed the relationship of different synergy management mechanisms. 
He researched the potential intension and action mechanisms which are affected by 
forming mechanisms, competence mechanisms and operating mechanisms. The 
result showed the constraint mechanisms were involved in market, price strate gic 
alliance, sharing of ships, insurance and maintenance, allocation of revenue which 
could make each enterprise operate independently. (Chen, 2012) 
Jiang (2003) reviewed the transatlantic line, briefed the trend in history and analysed 
the status of the development. Author thought shipping alliance is the future trend. 
Through the line stable agreement make macroeconomic control in the route. The 
future market was forecasted in the buyer market, and ensuring the background of 
the operator in the route. The fierce competence forced shipping companies updated 
the strategy which was based on the data and qualitative analysis. Finally, author 
gave some advice to china enterprise to compete in transatlantic line. (Jiang M. , 
2003) 
Gao and Liu (2012) investigated on the successful factor of the shipping alliance. 
They combined the structure, culture and risk with the form process of shipping 
alliance. Besides, they built a model of alliance structure and analyse the real case. 
They purposed a theory model which has 5 steps and in 3 dimension. (Gao, 2012) 
Table1- Model of alliance structure 









2 Partner choice Related document, 
demand, adaption, 
experience 





attitude to risk 




Sharing profit and 
risk 
4 Achievement  Rules, responsibility, Promise of senior System risk 
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cooperation staff, frequency of 
communication 
management, 
program risk control 
5 End  Change of program Vision of 
development 
Successful and fail 
experience  
 Structure  Culture  Risk  
Source: Author; based on (Gao, 2012) 
Ding (2003) not only researched the alliance in economic theory but also talked 
about the anti-trust between the shipping alliances and local government. Author 
purposed even the shipping companies are under the same alliance, the competence 
could be more fierce than others. Because the price is the only thing that company 
can negotiate. Maybe some companies have agreements in some routes but they may 
compete in other routes. The alliance is the key to the development of shipping 
alliances. (Ding, 2003) 
Liao (2007) purposed shipping alliance controlled the capacity not to boost and made 
member enterprises aware only to be joint could make the stable increase in profit 
and avoid the fluctuation of freight. Author compared the advantage and 
disadvantage of alliance and conference and illustrated the oligopoly market 
structure is the factor leading the shipping alliance development. Model based on 
game theory were built to analyse the reason why shipping enterprises wanted to 
alliance. The performance was better than before which was analysed on data. It is 
helpful to establish the shipping alliance, which chased the development trend.  (Liao, 
2007) 
Prof M. Panayides (2011) illustrated the dynamics in the container shipping market. 
Top 20 liner shipping companies‟ fleet characteristics are collected to show the 
capacity which can explore the potential interrelations between the service and 
company‟s size and the desire to created agreements then to hypothesis development. 
Authors thought the importance of alliances has become more relevant because 
abolition of the liner conference and the viable route and good performance. The 
geographic reason also affected the alliance agreements. Operative performance and 
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strategy adjust the alliance. The capacity increasing represented the supply over the 
demand, so the shipping companies signed the agreements to reduce the overall 
capacity. The data also showed the good market can continue the stability of the 
alliance. The high dynamics in the Asia market was closely connected to the 
economics in America and Europe (Photis, 2011). 
Ji Q. and Jiang N. (2016) wrote a survey which contains some forecast of 3 big liner 
shipping CEO. Maersk CEO Soren S. said the a little bit change of competence 
pattern could influence the shipping industry. The merger and acquisition of shipping 
enterprise shock the market which makes shipper fearful and they wanted to 2M 
alliance to be their sanctuary. Due to Ocean alliance occupied larger market share 
than 2M in Transatlantic. So 2M attached the Hyundai shipping to sign the 
agreements to increase the routes. In his opinion, it is hard for the small and medium-
sized enterprises to make a choice whether to be a global carrier, a zone carrier or 
acquainted by other big company. The advisory body SeaIntel pointed out that there 
are 18 enterprises in top 40 liner shipping companies have disappeared. The trend is 
deeply represented that the bigger of shipping company, the higher of survival rate. 
Research shows the survival enterprises have extraordinary growth ability. So the 
alliance strategy prevented the company from being squeezed out the market. (Ji & 
Jiang, 2016) 
Dong Y. Miao J. and Xiao N. (2011) applied core theory to the liner shipping 
alliance‟s stability. They focused on the source of the revenue. The relationship 
between the market demand and the shipping alliance‟s supplies can affect the 
stability. Author explored the stability which can be connected to the increasing 
vessel size. (Dong, Miaojia, & Xiaoning, 2011) Song and Panayides (2002) applied 
core theory to shipping alliance shows it is fair to members to allocate the profit.  
(Song & Panayides, 2002) 
Rawindaran N. (2015) researched the strategies among the container shipping 
companies under the regulation 4056/86. The dissertation researched the arguments 
created by Ministry of China, European Commission and US Federal Maritime 
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Commission, to reject the P3 alliance. The potential reason of the fail is the much 
more control of coordination centre, the slots are not used and make decisions on 
suspensions, which is objected by Chinese. (Rawindaran, 2015)   
Ji F. and Gin S. (2004) used a MCDM method to select strategic partners for liner 
shipping company.  Authors developed a selection model from the criteria which 
contained ideal, anti- ideal and entropy. The method is based on Fuzzy set theory. 
They found facilitates usually based on feelings. (Ji-Feng & Gin-Shuh, 2004) 
2.2 Research on Concentration Ratio 
Concentration Ratio is a key factor which could reflect the monopoly level of the 
market. Concentration Ratio is involved to distribution of enterprise scale and 
usually as the significant dimension of market structure, which has an important 
effect on enterprise action and market performance. Although Concentration Ratio is 
not the only one standard to examine the monopoly, it is just the substitution index of 
the market power. Chicago school thought abusing of market power could be as the 
anti-trust standard and the judicial practice may be more and more inclined to this, 
but the monopoly market structure must aggravate the action of abusing of market 
power. 
Che D. and Andreas B. (2016) presented a tool to calculate the market concentration 
ratios from a large environmental based on the Excel. The tool is capable of 
matching environmental media samples to biota samples based on user-defined 
spatial and temporal criteria to derive a representative estimate of the environmental 
exposure conditions of an organism and its accumulation. Some potential benefits 
and uses of the tool are discussed. (Doering & Bollhofer, 2016) 
Guo and Li (2007) researched on the concentration ratio which could be connected to 
the industry market. They found the concentration ratio could be low if the market 
would be expanded. HHI was analysed and high concentration ratio can push the 
industry development. (Guo & Li, 2014) 
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Li (2016) analysed the increasing concentration ratio can reflect the efficiency and 
market power. Author purposed an optimization formula of enterprise action based 
on new industry research method. Then author transited the formula to industry, he 
applied the Lerner index to measure monopoly power, and leading the effect of 
oligopoly and scale economic effect formula of growth of concentration ratio. 
Parametric maximum likelihood method showed similar estimation effects in 
monopoly power, cost elasticity. The research showed the scale economy of 
concentration ratio growth could reduce the 60% of price in the market. However, 
effect of oligopoly should overall the scale economy, which would lead most prices 
up. (Li, 2016) 
Fang (2015) purposed to develop the shipping alliance, add the concentration which 
is beneficial to allocate the capacity, and make the supply meet the demand perfectly, 
which could make the development of big vessels in reasonable situation. (Fang, 
2015) 
2.3 Research on Trade  
Lv (2015) analysed the mechanism of seaborne trade which could be influenced by 
liner shipping market structure. At the same time, author applied the multi- regression 
to analyse the influence between seaborne trade and liner shipping structure. The 
result shows the enterprise scale, product differentiation and barrier to entry could 
have a positive effect on the seaborne export. Finally, some real case and related 
policy should be presented to improve the liner shipping market. (Lv, 2015) 
2.4 Research on rules and regulations of shipping 
alliances 
Yang (2003) researched the legislation of EU, America, Australia and China. 
Although the rules are different, the fundamental cause is to choose carrier or shipper 
as a breakthrough point and to protect the benefit of whole country. Through 
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Shipowners' Association and Carriers‟ Association have a different attitude to 
analyse every association have their protection action. (Yang, 2003) 
Lin, Yin and Zhang (2015) compared and analysed monopoly level based on market 
concentration ratio and they wanted to complete anti-trust legislation in China 
container market, which could prevent the foreign company create monopoly and 
protect own market. (Yin, 2015) 
2.5 Summary  
In this chapter, I review the related articles which are involved in many fields. From 
an objective perspective, shipping alliance is a product created by economic theory 
and business trend. Liner shipping companies establish alliance strategy to increase 
their operation performance but government also formulate related policy to restrict 
the market power shipping alliance. In next chapters, I will research the deep 
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3 Forming reasons, operations and development 
of liner shipping alliance 
3.1 Liner shipping alliance main form  
(1) Liner conference 
International shipping alliance is a liner service agreement covered by all the service 
of joint operation route which is signed by some operators. During the World War 
1&2, shipping conference had a significant influence in making the freight rate stable 
and market regulation, which provided cooperation chance to shipping company and 
urged the seaborne trade development in a low consume. However, the disadvantage 
of powerful monopoly in the shipping conference was exposed with the sustained 
development and perfection system of shipping market. Shipping conference is 
created in 20th century. The carriers who do the liner service in the same line wanted 
to avoid the competence, so they got an agreement on freight and the investment of 
capacity. The purpose of the conference is to monopoly the liner route and gets the 
huge profit. The strictest conference could allocate the income of all the members. 
To prevent the other ships which is not in the conference, they operated the “Combat 
ship” which used a low freight until the other ships leaved the market. The fee of 
“Combat ship” was paid by all the members. (Fusillo, 2006) Conference could 
punish the member who violated the rules of freight and investment of capacity until 
the member was dismissed. Many countries take the anti-trust policy to ban the 
conference with compulsory binding. The existing conferences are discussion of the 
nature of the organization which doesn‟t have compulsory binding. The members can 
decide whether to execute the rules according to their own situation.  
(2) Consortia 
Consortia are two and more shipping companies which want to start a program 
together so they create a temporary cooperation. The main purpose of consortia is to 
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reduce cost and raise service quality. The range of cooperation is in one route and 
company sign an agreement by route. 
(3) Stabilization agreement 
In 1980s, there is huge overcapacity in the international container market. The price 
of the 3 main routes plummeted and cannot be controlled. Under this situation, the 
member of liner conference and independent carrier get an agreement whose core is 
to prevent the excess capacity. Sealed ships are planned to maintain a favourable 
level of fares for shipping companies. However, both Federal Maritime Commission 
in United States and European thought stabilization agreement against American 
Maritime Law and European anti-trust Law. Stabilization agreement has been closed 
in recent years to limit capacity plans under pressure. 
(4) Shipping alliance 
Shipping strategic alliance originated from consortia. The agreements concluded by 
the liner companies in the formation of strategic alliances relate to the distribution of 
routes, the arrangement of shipping schedules and routes, the increase and 
withdrawal of the transport capacity, the port and connection inquiries, and the 
operation of the whole world. But the agreement does not lead to a merger, and each 
member maintains his relative independence. 
At present, major shipping companies are adopting strategic alliances to take the 
advantage in the transport service, cash flow and market service,  and breakthroughs 
in maritime transport. The cooperative effects of land transportation, wharf 
management and equipment management are produced in depth. 
3.2 History & Development 
In 1970s, shipping conference development reached its peak, all sorts of monopoly 
means of liner conferences and outrageous size also reached appalling proportions, 
caused from the global shippers, especially developing countries' strong 
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dissatisfaction and protest, they are opposed to developed countries passed the liner 
shipping monopoly, and hope to develop its own merchant fleet. 
The joint World Trade Centre conference held a maritime legislation conference in 
January 1972, requiring the development of new Guild rules. At the third session of 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and development in 1972, the group of 77, 
composed of developing countries, made a draft of the code of conduct for liner 
conferences through internal consultations. At the United Nations Convention on 
liner conferences in Geneva in April 6, 1974, the Convention on the code of conduct 
of the liner conference was adopted and entered into force on October 6, 1983. 
The Convention of the cargo distribution principle, conditions for membership and 
the association rate increase period, its formulation and implementation is conducive 
to developing countries to develop their own merchant, limit the monopoly of 
developed countries on the liner shipping. This is on the rise of the alliance and the 
liner conference will decline, quietly foreshadowed. 
First of all, the influence of liner trade is declining. With the cargo transportation has 
not limited to the developed countries, a large number of foreign ships will have to 
rise into the market, independent carrier and increasingly powerful, the status of the 
severe impact of liner, liner market share declined. (Winston, 2012) 
Since 1998, a large number of shipping companies have been out of the trade unions, 
some scholars believe that the system of liner conference is beginning to disappear 
from this year. 
Since 1990s, the contradiction between supply and demand in the liner industry has 
become increasingly acute, and the shipping market has entered an unprecedented 
difficult period. 
Despite the efforts of the shipping companies in line allocation, freight policy, 
service level and so on, increasing input and cooperation. But practice has shown that 
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a shipping company has become so difficult to operate on low transportation costs 
and high service quality. 
In this background, the world's major liner companies embarked on a large-scale 
joint venture. 
In September 1994, the five shipping companies, including the American President 
Lines, the Royal P&O Nedlloyd, OOCL, Mitsui and Malaysia International Shipping 
Corporation Berhad, formed the first alliance called the Global Alliance. 
Since then, again composed by Maersk and Sealand called "MAERSK SEALAND", 
besides, Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, Neptune Orient Lines (NOL) and P&O Containers for 
transport consisting of a "Grand Alliance" and later Hanjin, Germany Shipping Co, 
ChaoYang merchant formed the "United alliance" and Kawasaki, COSCO, 
YangMing Marine Transport Corp. component "CKY alliance" 
In 21 Century, with the gradual improvement of the economic environment is 
becoming increasingly open and fair competition consciousness, conference 
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In March 2003, the European Commission according to the European Shippers 
Association cancel the conference system request（the formal review of rationality 
of European Union Council Regulation 4056 / 86）, and in 14th December 2005 the 
Union Council of Ministers formally submitted and considered the "Revocation of 
the antitrust exemption of liner proposal". 
In 2006 September, the Council of Ministers of the European Union signed a 
timetable for the abolition of the antitrust exemption of the liner trade, namely, the 
formal abolition of liner privileges from October 18, 2008. 
Then, the chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) made it clear that 
antitrust exemption was not necessary. After the United States, the rest of the 
countries followed. The brilliant liner conference went to the end. 
3.3 Main operations in the shipping strategic alliance 
(1) Connecting 
From the schedule and cost, a carrier considers using connecting carrier to provide 
service of completing the transportation between ports. Most of carriers through 
connecting carrier agreement with others to complete extend services. 
The agreement sets the connecting carrier provides the service to customer in a range 
of transportation, bear relevant responsibility and risk and gather the freight at 
appointed rate. The acceptation one should pay according to the rate and quantity 
delivered. Besides, both can regulate the procedure in agreement (Kumar, 1999). 
(2) Slot charter 
The slot charter doesn‟t invest the vessels, but they hire a quantity of slot through 
others who have the lines which they wanted operate to join in the relevant route. 
Slot charter usually regulate the charter has no authority to intervene the provider‟s 
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operation activity. However, if provider coordinates the route, such as adjust the port 
of call and schedule and influence the forecast benefit of the charter. Charter has the 
authority to stop hiring the space. In this situation, containers are provided from 
charter, and charter operates independently. The only thing charters do is to pay the 
fixed rent regularly whether they use or not (Slack & McCalla, 2002). 
(3) Slot share 
Based on the original lines, each carrier could rent others‟ slot. This form can add the 
frequency density, extend the service cover, raise the service quality and enhance 
competency. Besides, both companies can keep the capacity and basic cost at the 
same level. The significant characteristic is every company can operate their own 
routes independently. However, if one company adjust the route which the company 
operates and influence other company in using slot, charter has authority to adjust the 
number of slot. 
In today‟s shipping industry, there is hardly any operator can depend on himself to 
meet shipper in schedule and cover etc. In case, utilise the rent part in others‟ route is 
an important and efficient strategy of raising competency and better the management 
effect in keeping basic cost. 
The fee of slot share is negotiated by each part. Fee is constituted by cost of ship, 
fuel and THC. The fee is referenced from average level in the market but not the 
fixed cost of each ship. So, the fee is nearly equalled, which the two lines with nearly 
ship type, number of ports of call and voyage mileage. Sometimes, the fee can use 
the same for simple; if carriers use the same slot each other and they don‟t need to 
use real cash settlement. 
(4) Joint dispatch 
Two and more operators get an agreement in one or more lines to dispatch together 
and regulate schedule, classes, port of call and specific quantity of ship investment, 
and ensure the available slot according to the proportion of investment ships. The 
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most significant specific is companies operate the route together. However, each 
company does the marketing independently. This form can make each one develop 
the market with a little cost and lower the barriers to entry and investment risk. 
An alliance agreement may include one or more of these forms of cooperation. 
3.4 Economic meanings 
3.4.1 Scales of economy and shipping alliance 
Generally speaking, scales of economy means when companies expand the scales of 
manufacture and operation, the unit cost will reduce. The traditional way to achieve 
economies of scale are usually rely on their self-expanding reproduction or by means 
of enterprise merger and the enterprise scale is continually expanding, but company 
rely on the single enterprise scale to achieve economies have scale limitations: one is 
to expand the scale of enterprises has its own internal boundary. When the scale of 
production and operation of enterprises expands to a certain stage, it leads to the 
decrease of scale efficiency and the phenomenon of diseconomies of scale. This is 
mainly because the scale of the enterprise meeting leads to "Organizational Failure" 
and rising cost of management. Second, if the scale of the enterprise is too large, it 
will be prohibited and controlled by the anti-trust authorities. 
Under the double restriction of enterprise scale and internal and external obstruction, 
through setting up enterprise strategic alliance, it opens up third ways for enterprise 
to realize scale economy". Strategic alliances don‟t need to rely on expanding the 
scale of enterprises to achieve economies of scale. Two types of economies of scale 
can be realized through strategic alliances: economies of scale in technology and 
market. 
The Influence of Large International Container Ships is a trend in the last 15 years, 
and the unit capacity cost of container ships also obeys the scale effect principle. The 
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larger the carrying capacity of a single vessel, the lower the average unit carrying 
capacity (in USD/TEU/ days) is usual. 
By the end of 2013, there were 5586 container ships in the world, with a total 
capacity of 17988 thousand TEU. The >5000TEU ships are 1155,  occupying the total 
ship number 20.68%. Capacity is 9169 thousand TEU, occupying the total capacity 
of 50.97%.8000TEU ships number: more than 558, occupying the total number of 
ships 10%, and capacity up to 5393 thousand TEU, the total capacity of 30%. 
10000TEU ships number: more than 214, the total number of ships 3.83%, transport 
power was 2684 thousand TEU, occupying the total capacity of 14.92%. 
The world's top 20 liner shipping company has a total of 3339 ships, a total of 15694 
thousand TEU, which owned 1401 ships, a total capacity of 7953400 TEU. The 
average DWT is 5677 TEU. Leasing 1938 ships, the total capacity of 7740500 TEU, 
the average DWT is 3994TEU. Among them, Maersk shipping owns ship average 
box of 6195.25TEU; the president of the United States (APL) owns container ship 
average box is reached 7730.86TEU.  
According to these statistics, the average size of new shipbuilding has increased from 
4000TEU in 2009 to 8000TEU in 2014. At present, the proportion of container ships 
with ship sizes exceeding 8000TEU has reached 82% in new ship orders. Modern 
container ships are developing in large scale and high speed. 
With a premise of economic scale, the ship use rate is not reduced. Otherwise, the 
bigger the ship, the higher the cost is. According to Grimstad and Neumann Larson‟s  
(Neumann, 2013) "Economies of scale giant container vessels to quantify", the point 
of view is: compared to a ship loaded with 14000 TEU ships, if an 18000 TEU ship 
wants to achieve cost savings, the space utilization rate will have to reach at least 
91%. Thus, large ships caused a major consequence of "Alliance effect", that is to 
say, the allocation of super ships on the main route not only to increase the average 
capacity of ships on the route, but also to speed up the vessel carrier between the 
sharing protocol (VSA) and the establishment of strategic alliance. In the final 
 
- 25 - 
 
analysis, it is impossible for any carrier to sell all the cabins of every large ship 
carrying out regular voyage, so they have to continue to learn how to cooperate, not 
how to fight. 
The scale economy in the market means that the alliance enterprises have stronger 
market power in the target market by setting up the enterprise alliance. It can lower 
the market price to buy inputs and cut costs, can produce alliance "scale supply 
effect"; in addition, enterprises can also further expand its market boundary, that can 
achieve economies of scale in larger market scope, the so-called alliance expansion 
effect. These two economies of scale are formed by the expansion of market forces 
and market capacity after the establishment of an enterprise, and thus can be 
regarded as a scale economy on the market. Specific performance as follows: alliance 
enterprises to achieve the scale of procurement, reduce transaction costs; through the 
alliance to expand market space, achieve economies of scale in larger market scope; 
the transnational enterprise alliance, to achieve economies of scale on a global level; 
the construction of alliance network, achieve economies of scale in cooperation in 
the management of excessive; the inhibition of competition enterprises through the 
alliance, to achieve the industry's external economies of scale. 
To sum up, enterprise alliance can not only carry out specialized division of labour in 
a larger scope, reduce production costs, but also coordinate transaction costs by 
means of alliance coordination, and realize economies of scale in technology. At the 
same time, enterprises can further expand the boundaries of market activities through 
the alliance, and expand the scope of economies of scale, that means we can realize 
economies of scale in a larger market scale. 
Space rental, slot charter and mutual joint dispatch of ships can not only make the 
alliance members to fully enjoy low rent ship. Fixed costs bring large ships, and the 
alliance often leads to members of the same alliance in the country to use the same 
dock, stevedoring company and water land transportation service providers, alliance 
members can often be combined with negotiation these suppliers, make contract 
conditions more favourable than separate negotiations with suppliers, thereby 
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reducing the cost. Through the alliance, we can expand the coverage of the routes, 
expand the market space, and make the existing resources more effective and realize 
economies of scale in a larger market. 
3.4.2 Alliances and economies of scope 
Economies of scope is refers to an enterprise diversification which means having a 
number of products in the market, which combined the business a number of 
business projects in different product or business, rather than confined to a single 
product or field more revenue, reduce and bring cost savings and risk. The scope 
economy can be divided into two levels: the scope economy of the product and the 
scope economy of the industry. (Kumar, 1999) The former realizes the scope 
economy of production through the diversification of products in the same industry; 
the latter gains the scope economy by permeating to other fields and carrying out 
industry diversification. 
Strategic alliances enable enterprises to expand the scale of production and operation 
without expanding their organizations, and expand the scope of business in the same 
way and realize economies of scope. The enterprises with some complementary 
resources and technologies can enter the new industry field through the formation of 
strategic alliances, which can produce "synthetic effect". 
Strategic alliances can also help companies effectively break the barriers to entry in 
diversification. For enterprises which want to achieve economies of scale in the new 
business areas will be faced with various barriers to entry restrictions, such as cannot 
transfer the patent technology, control of the key elements of production supply and 
marketing channels, the learning unique curve and implicit proprietary technology 
and the government's industrial policy. These factors are likely to become the new 
insurmountable entry barriers. Through establishing the alliance with relevant 
enterprises and using source can pass the above barriers. 
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In the process of obtaining economies of scope, enterprises are faced with various 
risks, such as investment risks, technical risks and market risks, etc., which can 
disperse and reduce all kinds of risks through alliance cooperation. 
The alliance can make the container liner operators expand the scope of route 
business and realize economies of scope. International container transportation 
industry is a capital intensive industry. In order to maintain a full container fleet 
composed of 12(3000TEU) in the east coast of the United States and Asia / 
Mediterranean / pendulum route, the ship fixed costs (ship depreciation or rent), fuel 
costs and port charges costs about $200 million a year. When operators acquire the 
economies of scope and enter the new route, they always face huge risk. Through the 
alliance can use a smaller investment expansion route of the scope of the operation, 
greatly reducing the barriers to entry and exit routes, effectively reduce the risk 
posed by a variety of environmental uncertainty. 
3.4.3 Speed economy 
In management theory, speed economy is the ability to respond quickly, that means 
the ability of an enterprise whether respond quickly in a competitive environment. If 
the enterprise is regarded as a resource conversion system, the economic efficiency 
of the enterprise will come not only from the quantity of the resource transformation, 
but also from the time of the resource transformation, which is the speed. Especially 
with the shortening of product life cycle and the change of market demand and the 
restriction of market capacity, it is difficult for enterprises to build their competitive 
advantage simply relying on scale economy. In this situation, agility and quick 
natural source become the first choice of enterprise organization, and the value of 
speed economy becomes more and more important. In order to adapt to the rapid 
change of environment, the key to survival and development of enterprises is to have 
high flexibility and quick response ability. The enterprise adapts the user's speed 
superiority and its function which is no less than the product cost and the quality 
competition superiority. 
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To establish cooperative relations between enterprises through the alliance, each 
enterprise focus its resources in the most areas of expertise, not only can reduce the 
cost and the accumulation of various technical development risks, but also can 
accelerate product development and shorten new product time to market, which 
obtains the speed of economic competitive advantage. 
Enterprise alliance does not require the formation of strict hierarchical structure, but 
the organization is each part of the loosely combination which is conducive to 
maintaining the flexibility of the organization, which can better adapt to the rapid 
changes in the market for products and shorten the period of technological 
innovation caused by the requirements. Cooperation plays an important role in the 
joint defence alliance cooperation group of enterprises. It can not only improve the 
member enterprise self-discipline, and promote mutual exchanges, so as to 
continuously improve the enterprise rapid changes of technology and market 
environment and to achieve the speed of economic development in the dynamic 
market environment. 
The alliance can greatly shorten the route scope expansion time, achieve 
comprehensive utilization expansion route because the alliance members of the 
transport resources‟ speed is much faster than one company own strength to rely 
solely on the route expansion speed, and the speed of economy gain competitive 
advantage. 
3.3.4 Symbiosis economy 
Symbiosis economy is an economic category which is put forward according to the 
principle of symbiosis in biology. "Symbiosis" means that in the natural environment, 
the two objects cannot exist alone and are attached to each other, and they are given 
to each other coexistence and symbiosis. 
The independent economic organizations form a symbiosis for the realization of 
similar resources sharing or heterogeneous resources complementation, so that the 
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optimization of resource allocation efficiency can be regarded as "symbiotic 
economy". Symbiotic economy is a kind of "Pareto" improvement, which can 
promote economic organizations to improve their own benefits, but also bring about 
the growth of social welfare. In general, when enterprises in the alliance process, 
resources can be realized in the mutual sharing and complementary and can 
effectively inhibit the alliance between members of the "excessive competition" 
behaviour, so as to improve the efficiency of resource allocation and achieve mutual 
economic. In addition, when the alliance is in the process of cooperation and 
competition, mutual complementary resources and core competence integration, 
alliance want to obtain new competitive advantage and win the favourable 
competitive position, which can be regarded as another form of economic symbiosis. 
Through cooperation with partners and even competitors, alliances, competitions and 
symbiosis have been widely accepted by the world enterprises. As the McKinsey 
consulting senior expert Joel Black and David Ernst pointed out: For most global 
companies at the expense of the complete competition era has ended, the traditional 
competition has not been possible to ensure a winner in the "Darwin game" has the 
low cost, the best products and services as well as the highest profit. The long, close 
battle has only dried up its resources and is unable to cope with the next round of 
competition and innovation. 
Many multinational companies increasingly understand: In order to compete in a 
cooperative, they must replace selfish behaviour. The enterprise should not blindly 
compete, but should only be competitive in its own core advantage, strengthen the 
competition in terms of value or be involved in order to maintain industry or field, 
and should cooperate in other related value chain and alliance partners or competitors, 
in order to maximize access to economic symbiosis. 
With the development and deepening of social division of labour, enterprises form an 
interdependent relationship with each other. But enterprises are in a highly 
competitive market environment. In order to maximize their own interests, they often 
do nothing to destroy this interdependent symbiosis. In fact, some enterprises adopt 
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selfish means: they will lead to a mutual dependence between enterprises suffered 
losses, thus may lead to other enterprise's revenge and finally lead to "Double lose". 
Through the formation of strategic alliances between enterprises can not only bring 
direct benefits to the enterprise, but also will change the pattern of market 
competition. The enterprise wants to win a favourable competitive position, which is 
the concrete manifestation of the economic symbiosis in enterprise strategic alliance. 
Especially in the oligopolistic competition structure, strategic alliance has become an 
important competition way for enterprises to develop their own living space, realize 
symbiosis economy, and also a new strategy of "following the leader". In the 
oligopolistic competition structure of one industry or regional market, one or more 
strategic alliances will cause more enterprises to respond mutually, which will lead to 
the development of more intercompany symbiosis alliance. 
The international container liner operators are able to realize the optimization and 
improvement of the efficiency of resource allocation by realizing the sharing and 
complementarity of resources, which can be regarded as "symbiotic economy". 
Through international container liner transport operator establish alliances, resources 
can be realized in the mutual sharing and complementary, effectively inhibit the 
single operator blindly increase resources and avoid the waste of resources, so as to 
improve the efficiency of resource allocation and to achieve symbiosis economic. 
International container transportation industry is a typical oligopoly market with an 
oligopoly competition structure. Strategic alliance has become the enterprise to 
expand the development space and an important way to achieve symbiotic economic 
competition, but also a new kind of "follow the leader" strategy, the one or two 
alliance will inevitably lead to more enterprises to make corresponding reaction of 
symbiotic alliances to drive the development of more companies, and the alliance has 
become the inevitable trend of development of international container transportation 
industry. 
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4 Present situation and structure of shipping 
strategic alliance  
4.1 Trade situation 
The ship on the delivery of cargo capacity, the market continues to expand the scale, 
single ship capacity continued to rise. By the end of 2015, the global container 
capacity reached 3644TEU, which an increase of 5.59% compared with 2014. Global 
container total capacity was 21688 thousand TEU, an increase of 7.06%; global 
container fleet capacity was 19696 thousand TEU, an increase of 7.95% of 2014, 
which is an average annual acceleration. 
Container trade growth appears to have improved so far in 2016, reflecting the 
reversal or softening of two of the trends which slowed global container trade growth 
to just 2.2% last year (or just 1.5% in TEU-mile terms). Firstly, box volumes grew 
slightly on the Asia-Europe peak leg route in January-May 2016, after falling in 2015. 
Secondly, intra-Asian trade growth appears to have accelerated slightly in the year so 
far, having softened considerably in 2015. However, North-South box trade growth 
has remained weak in the year to date. While there remain a number of risks, global 
box trade growth is projected to improve to 3.8% this year, or 3.4% in TEU-mile 
terms. 
Global container trade growth is projected to accelerate in 2016, following limited 
expansion last year, with indicators of trade growth on several key routes improving 
in the year to date. Peak leg Far East-Europe trade volumes have improved in 2016 
so far, which is partly expected to underpin an increase in the rate of mainland trade 
growth this year to 3.2%. Growth in intra-Asian box trade is also expected to pick up 
pace to reach 4.1% in full year 2016. However, elsewhere, trade on North-South 
routes remains weak and some risks remain in the global economy. Overall, global 
box trade is projected to expand 3.8% in 2016 to total 181.6m TEU. (Clarksons, 
2016) 
 
- 32 - 
 
 
4.2 Market share in Far East - N. America and Far East – 
Europe 
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Maersk announced in October 10, 2014, and the Mediterranean Shipping set vessel 
sharing agreement in Asia and Europe, across the Atlantic, across the Pacific route 
for a period of 10 years, named 2M approved by the U.S. Federal Maritime 
Commission (FMC). FMC is the last regulatory authority that the ship sharing 
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agreement needs to be approved. This means that the 2M alliance has been approved 
by all relevant regulatory authorities and will be operational as planned from January 
2015. The ship sharing agreement includes about 185 ships, with an estimated 
capacity of 2100 thousand TEU. Among them, Maersk shipping will have 110 ships 
sharing agreements, the design capacity of about 1 million 200 thousand TEUs, will 
account for 55% of total capacity. Mediterranean Shipping will have 75 ships to 
participate in the sharing agreement. The design capacity is about 900 thousand 
TEUs, accounting for 45% of the total capacity. Maersk said it will achieve cost 
savings by deploying larger, more efficient ships and increasing ship stowage rates. 
In the new East-West route network, the Maersk Line will increase from the current 
18 to 21, and the number of anchored ports will increase from 212 to 291. 
Unlike previous P3 alliances involving market monopolies, the 2M does not need 
approval from China's regulatory authorities.  The 2M attribute is just an ordinary 
vessel sharing agreement, 2M lack of overall market share in the East-West route 
30%, only slightly higher proportion of the Asia Europe route, so it is not under the 
jurisdiction of China "anti-monopoly law" range, without the approval of the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce.  In accordance with relevant regulations, 2M just needs to be 
submitted to the Ministry of transportation before the implementation of the filing, 
and Maersk has fulfilled this process. Compared with the P3, 2M reduces volume, 
market share, and meet regulatory requirements. 
In addition, there is no "network centre" as an entity in the establishment of the 
operating institutions, and one of the regulatory bodies is used to coordinate the 
shipping space.  The alliance operates from London operations centre downgraded 
Coordination Committee to monitor daily operations, and in all the cargo stowage, 
voyage arrangements, port operations, sales, pricing, marketing and customer service 
etc. are completely independent, sharing does not include any business tasks and 
responsibilities. 
Hyundai Merchant Marine‟s (HMM) plans to join the 2M Vessel Sharing Agreement 
are still pending, according to Caroline Becquart, MSC‟s senior vice-president and 
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head of Asia Network and VSA. Although HMM signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with Maersk and MSC on 14 July in order to join the 2M in April 
2017, talks with HMM have not been concluded yet and MSC hinted at the 
possibility that an agreement may not be reached. 
Ocean alliance: 
The three major alliances were launched in April 1st, and the ocean alliance has 350 
ships (3500 thousand TEU), which is the largest of the three major alliances and the 
most of direct line covers. In the Pacific (41%), Asia and Europe routes (35%), the 
Far East to the red sea line (38%) of transport capacity share, which occupy the main 
position. On the East and West trunk line, it is not the competition between the liner 
companies, but the alliance competition. The company delivered 5 large vessels in 
2017, totalling 40 thousand TEU, and the company's overall breakeven point is 
higher than the industry average. 
The world's fourth largest shipping company COSCO Group and the SIPG intends to 
HK $78.67 / share offer the world's seventh largest shipping company 100% stake in 
OOCL. If the tender offer is completed, COSCO Shipping and sea control under the 
two companies OOCL team total capacity will total more than 2 million 900 
thousand TEUs (including orders). Operating fleet of more than 400 vessels in size 
or will race to third place in the world, COSCO will replace CMA-CGM, becoming 
the third largest companies in the world container transportation. 
Membership of a global alliance was one of the conditions for HMM's major 
creditors to agree to a debt adjustment plan. The Korean carrier originally sought to 
join the „THE‟ Alliance, but was not included in the initial group of six carriers 
(Hanjin, Hapag-Lloyd, K Line, MOL, NYK and Yang Ming), which on 13 May 
announced an agreement to create a new alliance that is scheduled to begin 
operations  in April 2017.  
THE alliance: 
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The demise of Hanjin will affect the size of „THE‟ Alliance and the overall capacity 
distribution between alliances. The five remaining „THE‟ members, together with 
UASC which has since signed a merger agreement with Hapag-Lloyd, would have a  
combined market share of 28% on the Transpacific and of 23% on Asia-Europe, 
based on Alphaliner projections, compared to 35% and 28% respectively if Hanjin‟s 
capacity share was included. None of „THE‟ Alliance members have made any 
announcements on their future plans so far, but it is expected  that  they  could  still  





5 Governance strategy of shipping alliance 
5.1 Theory basic of governance strategy 
5.1.1 The structuralism of Harvard School 
Harvard School is the mainstream economics foundation of American antitrust law 
from 1930 to 1960s. It puts forward the theory of structural anti-monopoly. They 
claim SCP system, which means Schedule→Conduct→Performance. The market 
structure determines the behaviour of the enterprise in the market, and the market 
behaviour of the enterprise will further determine the performance of the enterprise 
in the market (Xu G. , 2015). The final performance of enterprise market plays an 
important role in antitrust regulation policy determination and antitrust law. 
Therefore, Harvard school pays attention to the market structure, the market structure 
that is eventually a key point of antitrust policy. 
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The school believes that the key factor affect the market structure is the 
concentration of firms in the market and barriers to entry. High barriers to market 
entry will have a negative impact on market performance. The Harvard School 
according to the data and the experience found there is a positive relationship 
between the high degree of market concentration and the rate of profit. High market 
concentration rate tends to get more profit than the low market concentration, while 
the high market concentration is often created by large enterprises and its own 
market forces or Oligarch. As a result, the competition in the market will be further 
weakened. Leading to monopoly enterprises to benefit alone, but the market 
performance is obviously low. According to structuralism, the market structure with 
higher concentration of market usually has higher market entry barriers. Based on the 
market structure, enterprises often take anti-competitive market behaviour, such as 
monopoly or collusion. Free competition mechanism of the existence of such acts 
would undermine the market, resulting in relatively low market economic benefits. In 
order to correct the market failure, promoting market competition and ensure good 
market performance, Harvard School proposed the government must pass the anti-
monopoly law to intervene in the market structure, which can prevent monopoly and 
collusion. Change individual firms in the market monopoly restrictions in large 
enterprises‟ merging and acquiring, and not allowed to set the man-made obstacles 
(Tang, 2008). 
5.1.2 Efficiency doctrine of Chicago school 
The efficiency doctrine was put forward by the Chicago school which started in 
1980s to become the mainstream thought of the American antitrust law, which is the 
reform of the Harvard School of structuralism, known as the "Chicago revolution", 
has made a significant contribution to the development of its anti-monopoly law. 
The efficiency doctrine of view: first, the market mechanism is perfect, most of the 
market is competitive, and can realize the effective competition in the market only 
with many enterprises in the market, as long as there is no conspiracy, also can 
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realize the competitive market. Even if the market competition is not enough, the 
price monopoly will be attempted because of the entry of the enterprise. The free 
entry enterprise will eliminate the market power of the monopoly enterprise. The 
market monopoly and low market performance not lead to market failure, but 
because mandatory government intervention caused by the monopoly is often the 
result of government intervention policy caused by barriers to entry. The doctrine of 
efficiency advocates that the government should reduce market interference and 
make the market mechanism full play its role of self- regulation so as to realize the 
full competition of the market. Second, although horizontal mergers between 
enterprises impact on the market price, it will also have a cost saving effect, such as 
vertical restraints, tying price discrimination and integration between enterprises. The 
enterprises want to realize the saving of transaction cost and make the efficiency of 
selection. Third, the high degree of concentration is positively related to the 
efficiency of the enterprise, which is the result of market competition, beneficial to 
the whole market and society, and does not support the existence of monopoly in the 
market structure. Fourth, the enterprise purpose is to maximize profits, they make 
rational decisions according to the market. The strategic behaviour is mostly adopted 
in order to get efficiency of the normal competitive behaviour. Supply is decided by 
the nature of the enterprise, which should not be defined as entry barriers or 
monopoly. Fifth, cartel is not only required to reach a conspiracy agreement between 
enterprises, but also needs information symmetry between each other to maintain 
monopoly status, and general restrictions are difficult to produce adverse 
consequences. 
That means, the market share of the views of Chicago school are not so seriously as 
Harvard school. Market share will be just as one of the judges of the monopoly 
factors. High market share of enterprise does not have absolute prohibition. Market 
will adjust their performance. The enterprise with high efficiency can survive in the 
competition, and occupy more market share. Simply speaking, the Harvard School 
believes that the huge market share will affect the market performance, they pay 
more attention to the market structure, but the thought of Chicago School is that only 
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enough market performance can enable enterprises to occupy more market share, so 
they pay more attention to the market performance. Two kinds of theories of the 
causal relationship between the market structure and market performance is 
completely opposite. 
Therefore, the Chicago school is different from Harvard School, whose think is 
freedom of competition. They believe that the power of market mechanism that is the 
normal market economy competition. Monopoly is only temporary, and the market 
mechanism can adjust by itself to achieve a completely competitive market, so this 
does not require mandatory government intervention in the market. It is a relaxation 
of enterprise behaviour. Prevent the government excessive intervention of antitrust, 
advocate the establishment of effective anti-monopoly mechanism and 
implementation system, and construct political and legal system can effectively 
monitor and control the government‟s interference behaviour. The purpose is to 
realize the anti-monopoly system which has self-regulating ability and under 
government intervention.   
5.1.3 The strategic theory of the latter Chicago school 
The latter Chicago school thought was born in 1980s. It mainly analyses the strategic 
behaviour of enterprises to explain some industrial organization problems which are 
not accurate or unclear by traditional theory. Different from the Chicago school 
believed perfect market mechanism. Latter Chicago school believes the market is not 
perfect. “Not perfect” is the main effect of asymmetric market information, sunk cost, 
enterprise strategy and network effects based on various factors. 
Latter Chicago School thought: first, the market strategy of enterprises between the 
interactions of enterprise is the people involved in each game. The results caused by 
the competition behaviour are not only the competitors will out of the market, but 
also they enhance the competition of production and sales cost. Thus they weaken 
the opponent competition ability. The latter Chicago school holds the view that the 
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market structure is the endogenous result of the game of enterprise strategy rather 
than exogenous. Second, the information is not symmetric in the market and even the 
existence of information asymmetry generally. Whether between enterprises or 
consumers have asymmetry. Enterprise with information superiority is bound to 
achieve strategic advantages and use own advantage in the market. Third, the 
competition between enterprises will be incomplete because of the existence of sunk 
costs in the process of the game between the enterprises. Their advantages are 
asymmetric, compared with other enterprises in the competition usually has a certain 
first mover advantage, they can through a series of strategies, such as investment, the 
first patent, space pre-emption, to interfere or hinder competition or to enter the 
enterprise strategy, so as to realize their own strategic advantage. Fourth, the Chicago 
School thought that is the collusion between enterprises cannot be maintained, but 
latter the Chicago school through the super game theory to analyse the problem 
believe that if the effective punishment mechanism exists, collusion can actually be 
maintained. Fifth, they don‟t object to the use of market structure as the criteria of 
monopoly. The strategic behaviour is influenced by the structure of the market. 
Companies have a market advantage may provide convenience for the various 
restrictions on competition strategy behaviour. If the enterprises do not have market 
advantage, the strategy of enterprises won‟t help to choose based on efficiency 
reason. Moreover, the market structure, as the judgment standard of anti-monopoly 
law enforcement, can reduce the cost of law enforcement and enhance the 
effectiveness and efficiency of law enforcement. (PUENPATOM, 2006) 
In summary, we can see that the latter Chicago school combines the viewpoints of 
Harvard School and Chicago school, and believes that the strategic behaviour taken 
by enterprises in the market is likely to lead to monopoly. Besides, after monopoly is 
formed, it is difficult to eliminate itself only through self-regulation of the market 
mechanism. It is necessary for the government to formulate corresponding anti-
monopoly policies or enact anti-monopoly law to intervene and adjust the strategic 
behaviour of enterprises. Only market adjustment and government intervention work 
together can eliminate monopoly. Therefore, the latter Chicago school does not 
 
- 41 - 
 
oppose the intervention of the Harvard School, nor oppose the efficiency of the 
Chicago school. Instead of trusting and relying solely on the government or the 
market, it advocates a careful analysis of all behaviours restricting competition, a nd 
then carries out options and rulings. 
5.2 The governance of shipping alliance monopoly in 
European 
5.2.1 European Union Shipping anti-monopoly Legislation 
The anti-trust legislation of EU shipping alliance can be divided into “EC Treaty”，
legal documents enacted by EU council & commission and rules established by the 
European Commission. 
First of all, the EC Treaty is the most fundamental legal norm of the European Union, 
and its provisions on competition and monopoly are the basis of the European 
Union's anti- trust system of shipping. It has the highest legal force and is binding on 
all governments, enterprises and individuals of the member states of the European 
Union. The most important content of the EU anti-monopoly legislation is the 
provisions of the No. 81, 82 Treaty of the European community, which are about 
prohibiting restrictions on competition and prohibiting the abuse of market 
dominance. 
As the main decision-making body of the European Union, the Council of the 
European Union has the function of making laws and regulations of the European 
Union. It has developed a series of regulations on how to apply the No. 81 and 82 
article of the EC Treaty. In the field of shipping, it is mainly embodied in the 
regulation No. 4056 / 86 of the rules for the implementation of the No. 85 and 86 
article of the EC Treaty on maritime transport. Apart from this, there are various 
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antitrust laws and regulations relating to maritime transport, such as the regulation of 
4057/ 86 on unfair pricing practices. 
Most of the EU regulations on anti-trust of the shipping association are promulgated 
by the European commission. Include the rule of “joint exemption in the EC 
Competition Law” (870/95) promulgated in 1995. There are also No. 611/2005 rule 
for the revision of 23/2000 rule and the existing No. 906/2009 rules. 
5.2.2 Standard of European shipping alliance monopoly 
The identification of the monopoly of the shipping alliance is mainly from the 
following two aspects, as long as the alliance involves one aspect of the content, it 
will be considered to be monopoly: 
One aspect is whether judgment actions are belonged to a restrictive competition 
agreement between shipping companies. Restrictive competition agreement refers to 
may affect trade between member countries, which aims to impede, restrict or distort 
the common market competition between enterprises and enterprises signed the 
agreement to make joint decisions or actions. Restrictive competition agreements can 
be represented as: (1) Enterprises use a direct or indirect method to fix the prices of 
goods traded together in the market. (2) Enterprises restrict and control the 
production, sale, market investment and technological improvement of the products. 
(3) Enterprises split the market or share the supply of goods. (4) Enterprises put 
forward different trading conditions for different trading objects in the same trading 
market, leading to the other side in a bad competitive position. (5) In the contract 
signed by the enterprise, additional conditions which have not relevant purpose with 
the basic purpose of the contract have been attached to the contract as the 
prerequisite for signing the contract. The EU considers the situation to be ineffective 
since it meets the characteristics of the restrictive competition agreement.  That is to 
say, as long as it constitutes an agreement restricting competition, it will have no 
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effect from the date of its creation, and shall not go through the judgment of the court 
or the arbitration institution. 
The European Union has a level of demand for its restrictive competition agreements, 
which are supposed to be significant.  Non-significant restrictions on competition 
agreements are not prohibited by the European Union. The development of judicial 
practice and to judge the standard of degree, that limits the competition agreement in 
the total annual sales of enterprises should be more than 200 million euros, or 
enterprise horizontal agreement in the market share occupy more than 5% enterprises, 
vertical agreements in the market share occupy more than 10% belong to a 
significant degree. However, the significant degree of this standard applies only to 
the general business, for the identification of significant degree of shipping 
enterprises in the liner market competition restriction agreement can reach 30% 
because of its special and different from other companies (Li, 2016). 
However, not all the competition agreements that have reached significant levels will 
be ineffective from beginning to end. The third paragraph of article 81 of the 
European Community Treaty provides exceptions. As long as the restriction of 
competition agreements is conducive to the production, sale and perfection of 
products, consumers will be ensured to enjoy the fair benefits and without restricting 
the competition between enterprises, and the right of monopoly exemption can be 
applied. 
Another aspect is to determine whether shipping companies have the advantage of 
abusing the market dominance. The abuse of dominant position behaviour refers to 
one or more enterprises in all or most of the common market dominant position, 
abuse of the dominant position of influence between the other members of the trade 
behaviour. The EU special list of abusive behaviours: the use of dominance will be 
unfair trading price directly or indirectly imposed by traders; take advantage of the 
status of limited production and marketing of products, control products for the 
improvement of production technology and damage the interests of consumers; take 
different trading conditions on the same trading market in different transaction to 
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object the traders who have competitive disadvantage; the additional condition has 
not relevant purpose with the purpose of the contract as the contract condition 
coincidence. Although the EU lists these behaviours superficially similar to the 
above restrictive competition agreement, the difference between the two is that the 
key is the abuse of dominant market position of the companies have the advantage 
position and realize the means of behaviour is the abuse of dominance or not, 
however, the restriction competition agreement is realized through the collusion 
agreement among enterprises. Moreover, the law restricts the competition agreement 
merely as invalid. It also stipulates the exceptions of individual exemption, and the 
abuse of advantageous position is absolutely prohibited. Even if the alliance 
behaviour of the liner company is entitled to antitrust exemption, the market share of 
the alliance or shipping union will also be stipulated. If members of the relevant 
market share of the market exceed 30%, the abuse of dominant position cannot be 
exempted. 
In addition to the above two aspects, the European Union has also granted collective 
exemption to the action of the shipping alliance. In the premise of companies not 
exceeding the prescribed market share, between liner-shipping companies on sharing 
and integration of transport capacity resources, adjust their use of ports and related 
services to cope with supply and demand fluctuations, and relates to the alliance in 
order to achieve the purposes of they are able to use the monopoly exemption.  
However, once there is a fixed liner service price, or other exempt from the 
temporary adjustment capacity of other trade restrictions or transport behaviour, or 
the allocation of behaviour of market and customers, company will no longer enjoy 
monopoly exemption rights. 
In summary, it can be seen that the EU judged the monopoly of the shipping alliance 
are mainly by whether the behaviour of the shipping enterprises will have a negative 
impact on the fair competition in the market. The main index used is the market 
share of the enterprises in the relevant market. This standard is more inclined to the 
Harvard School structuralism and pays attention to the market structure. Based on the 
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market structure adjustment to ensure fair competition in the relevant market, and 
antitrust policy developed by the government to regulate shipping alliance 
5.3 Antitrust system of EU shipping alliance  
5.3.1 Antitrust enforcement agency 
The European Union does not set up a special anti-monopoly enforcement 
organization of the shipping alliance, but the general antitrust enforcement agency is 
responsible for the regulation of the shipping joint venture and anti-monopoly. 
(Wsish, 1992) Under the European Union system, the European Commission, as an 
executive body of the European Union, will be responsible for the implementation of 
antitrust related issues. Its functions mainly include the following aspects: 
First, it has the right of investigation, if there is a violation of the EU's antitrust 
regulations on the shipping agreements between the liner companies, the European 
Commission can investigate the suspected enterprises. 
Second, it has the right to punish the monopoly. It is possible to impose more severe 
fines on the parties involved in monopolistic conduct, or to order the monopoly to be 
separated from the alliance. 
Third, the European Union country has the right to prosecute the government of the 
member state in violation of European Union competition law. 
In addition to the above-mentioned functions of the law enforcement, the European 
Commission may also make laws, regulations drafting, promulgation and revision of 
the relevant legal issues concerning the anti-monopoly, and have a certain legislative 
power. 
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5.3.2 Antitrust exemption 
Although the European Union announced its decision to remove the antitrust 
immunity of the liner conference from October 18, 2008, the antitrust still remains 
exempt for the shipping alliance. There are three ways for exemption from monopoly 
in the shipping industry in EU: 
The first is the right to automatically obtain antitrust exemption from the date of 
action, such as the collective exemption of the shipping union mentioned earlier. As 
long as it meets the conditions of exemption, alliance can obtain the qualification of 
anti-monopoly exemption from the date of implementation. 
The second is the eligibility of the European Commission to decide exemption. The 
situation may be based on complaints from interested stakeholders or members of the 
government, or the European Commission. Investigating for an alliance or an 
agreement that may constitute a monopoly may be granted only if it meets the 
conditions for exemption. And the date of validity of the waiver is decided by the 
European commission. 
The third one is voluntarily declared by the parties concerned. The parties voluntarily 
apply to the European Commission, and the European Commission will issue an 
announcement in the official gazette of the European Union if the review fails to 
form a monopoly after examination by the European Commission on the basis of the 
application. A member or interested party disagree, he may make an objection within 
30 days. If 90 days of the announcement still do not indicate that the application has 
a monopolistic objection, then the relevant behaviour will be exempted. The right of 
exemption start from the date of action or declaration. On the contrary, if the 
discovery of suspected monopolistic behaviour during the announcement, the 
European Commission will turn to investigate it. The European Commission reserves 
the right to revoke its post and to determine the illegality and fines for the act of 
obtaining exemption (Liu, 2006).  
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5.3.3 Monopoly penalty system 
If there is a monopoly agreement or an action without a monopoly exemption and the 
monopoly is formed, the punishment will be imposed by the EU mainly includes: 
(1) To stop illegal activities, the 1/2003 Ordinance allows the European Commission 
to stop the monopoly of enterprises through two forms of action relief or structural 
relief. The Action relief is to prohibit the monopoly of the enterprise under the 
traditional supervision system, and the European Union can ask the shipping alliance 
to dissolve if the structural relief measures are taken; (2) If severe restrictions are 
imposed on competition, or even the competition is cancelled, special relief measures 
required by the European Commission should be implemented; (3) Fine: what in 
determining the amount of fines on the EU guidelines clearly stipulate strict penalty 
system. When the European Commission makes a penalty decision, it will determine 
the base of the penalty according to the extent of the monopoly.  Then, according to 
the duration of the behaviour, the weighted base is determined, and the final decision 
is made according to the market background, the benefits obtained by the enterprise 
and the payment ability of the enterprise; (4) Punitive continued fines: this form of 
punishment is to achieve the purpose of allowing enterprises, stop monopoly 
activities, abide by temporary measures and fulfil commitments. The European 
Commission requires the implementation of monopoly enterprises in a certain period 
of time each day to pay according to the standard specified amount, continue to pay 
time depends on the duration of the monopolistic behaviour. That is to say, as long as 
the monopoly exists one day, it will be punished as an independent monopoly (Yu, 
2005). 
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5.4 The governance of shipping alliance monopoly in 
America 
5.4.1 Anti-monopoly Legislation of American shipping 
The antitrust legislation in the United States consists of three main forms: The first is 
a series of statutes, including the Sherman law, the Clayton law, the Federal Trade 
Commission Act; the second is a large number of judicial precedents formed in 
judicial practice; the third is the various judicial guidelines issued by the Department 
of justice and the Federal Trade Commission. And the specific antitrust issues in the 
field of shipping, American statute law are mainly embodied in three laws, which are 
the Shipping law of 1916, the Shipping law of 1984 and the Ocean Shipping reform 
act of 1998. 
5.4.2 The criterion of monopoly of American shipping alliance 
The United States does not define the joint operations of shipping, consortium and 
shipping alliance, nor does it make the issue of antitrust as a key issue of the linkage 
between the liner companies as the European Union. Moreover, compared with the 
European Union, which tends to the Harvard School structuralism, the definition of 
monopolistic behaviour in the shipping field in the United States is more inclined to 
the Chicago school. It pays more attention to the final market efficiency between 
shipping enterprises. The shipping reform act of 1998 stipulated several agreements 
that could not enjoy anti-monopoly exemption. First, any agreement between the 
seagoing ocean carrier in the United States and the carrier of the air / rail / road 
carrier, or the waterway common carrier who does not apply to the law (Ocean 
Shipping Reform Act of 1998, 1998); The second is the agreement between the 
carriers of the law concerning inland sector costs during the United States transit  
(Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, 1998); Third is the agreement between the 
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common carriers of the law concerning the establishment, operation or maintenance 
of marine terminals in the United states; Fourth is all loyalty contract, which means 
an agreement between the shipper and the seagoing common carrier or the seagoing 
common carrier. Through the contract, the shipper shall deliver all or part of the 
goods to the carrier or the agreement within the stipulated time. A lower rate is 
obtained and the contract shall be subject to deferred rebate terms. Apart from that, 
for other shipping agreements, As long as it is filed in accordance with shipping 
reform act of 1998, in line with the relevant substantive conditions and procedural 
conditions, the right to antitrust exemption can be obtained. From this point of view, 
the United States has given more subjects of the right to enjoy antitrust exemption. 
The United States has not abolished the antitrust exemption of the liner conference as 
much as the European Union. The shipping reform act of 1998 also sets out different 
provisions for different types of agreements regarding the substantive aspec ts: 
special agreements such as liner conferences, ship sharing agreements, wharf 
operator agreements and other special regulations have been made.  And the 
agreement between other general ocean common carriers applies the corresponding 
general provisions.  
At the same time, FMC will oversee the implementation of competition law in the 
shipping sector. In the event of opposition to a cooperation agreement, the 
Commission provides evidence of the harm of competition arising from the 
agreement (Wang, 2000). Therefore, the United States will be more flexible in the 
control of the shipping alliance and other shipping agreements than the European 
Union. Its regulation of the shipping agreement is free.  In fact, the United States was 
the first country to issue the competition law and establish the exemption system of 
shipping monopoly. In the 1916 shipping law, it granted the right of antitrust 
exemption for the shipping industry. In the 1984 shipping law and the 1998 Shipping 
Reform Act, the government has maintained an attitude towards reducing the 
government interference in the shipping market. Of course, it does not mean that the 
United States has no regard for the market structure in terms of the standard of 
monopoly and not judged by market share. In the Federal Maritime Commission's 
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regulations on the exemption of agreements for low market share in the shipping 
market also reflect the United States' attitude towards market share standards.  
Overall, the United States for the shipping alliance monopoly standard dominated by 
the free market regulation of Chicago School. Government intervention in the market 
structure of Harvard School as a supplement to the judge, it gives more freedom to 
compete for shipping enterprises. 
5.5 Antitrust system of the American shipping alliance 
5.5.1 Antitrust enforcement agency 
Unlike the European Union, the United States has an exclusive maritime antitrust 
enforcement agency, the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC). It is an independent 
law enforcement department established under the federal organization programme, 
which is responsible for international shipping operations and enterprise management 
related to the United States and especially responsible for monitoring and 
management agreement between liner conferences and other shipping companies as 
the core. The functions of antitrust regulation in the shipping alliance include: 
whether the agreement violate the provisions of the relevant laws, the existence of 
monopoly or whether the agreement has the right to enjoy exemption granted by the 
law; to supervise the implementation of the agreement; to submit to the carrier the 
freight rates, additional charges and other details of the freight; to approve the freight 
level, punish monopoly, etc. (Wang, 2000). It can be said that FMC comprehensively 
regulates and manages the monopoly behaviour of shipping association from all 
aspects. 
The main difference between the European Commission and the FMC is that: Firstly, 
FMC has been set up in accordance with the provisions of the corresponding 
competition law, and is responsible for shipping related law enforcement powers,  
besides the law enforcement, the European Commission has the right of 
interpretation and legislative power; Second, FMC is generally regarded as a quasi-
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judicial body, while the European Commission is only an administrative organ, lower 
independent to the former; Third, FMC is a specialized law enforcement agency for 
shipping competition, and is not responsible for regulating monopoly in other fields.  
The European Commission is not only responsible for regulating monopoly in the 
shipping field, but also in other areas of monopoly. 
5.5.2 Antitrust exemption 
The United States does not have the right to grant collective exemption to the 
shipping alliance as the European Union does, in order to qualify for exemption in 
the United States, they are required to report to and submit to the FMC for approval.  
The FMC has the right to decide whether to grant antitrust exemption. As long as the 
exemption does not reduce the substance of the competition or cause damage to the 
business activities, the committee may waive the relevant legal obligations of any 
type of agreement in the field of shipping in accordance with the applicatio n or its 
own motion. Therefore, in order to obtain the qualification of antitrust exemption, the 
relevant alliance enterprises should be asked to submit their reports to the committee,  
after filing, the committee will notify the Federal Register within 7 days for 
publication, and will examine the reported agreement. If it is not rejected by the 
committee within 45 days after the date of filing, or the notice of notification shall be 
published in the Federal Register for 30 days. The agreement came into force at a 
later date. 
5.5.3 Freight management system 
The management system of the United States Freight in international shipping 
market can be within the scope of the whole world against is quite perfect, the price 
in the shipping market transparency and stability to a great extent, and is a very 
useful tool for judging the existence of monopolistic behaviour of shipping alliance. 
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The freight management system of the United States began during the World War 1. 
In the 1916 shipping law, the United States Freight reporting system was first 
established. This system has been stipulated as a nuclear system in the subsequent 
1984 shipping law and the 1998 Shipping Reform Act, and has made several changes.  
Today's freight management system has cancelled the freight reserve system, but the 
freight open system is still reserved. That is to say, the requirements for preparing the 
freight for the Federal Maritime Commission in the early days have been cancelled.  
The carrier is required to develop its own automatic electronic freight rate system, 
and the Commission will provide regular and periodic checks on the accuracy of the 
system information and the conditions for access to the system. The public can 
obtain the right to enter the system by paying reasonable fees, and the establishment 
of these systems enables the publication of American Freight rate. In general, in 
addition to the law clearly stipulates the price without a public goods, public carrier, 
conferences etc. should open their tariff in the automatic open system (Yu, 2005), 
which can also be released through agents to complete the task. 
The establishment of an open system of freight rates guarantees the right of the 
shipper, interested parties and other public to obtain accurate, reliable and useful fees 
and rates. Anyone can get the price book electronically without any restrictions. The 
carrier may charge for access to the system, but the standard of the charges should be 
reasonable and equitable, and the Federal Maritime Commission or other institution 
does not have the right to charge. 
Freight management system is also beneficial to the Federal Maritime Commission 
to open the freight carrier to carry out supervision and management  and to ensure the 
accuracy of the information and monitor the behaviour of the carrier. At any time 
they can know whether the carrier has formed the trend of monopoly. 
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5.5.4 Investigation and hearing system 
The Commission may investigate the possibility of monopolistic alliances or 
agreements on the basis of complaints or their own motions. After the investigation, 
the Commission may reject, cancel or modify the decision made on the recorded 
agreement before it acts as a monopoly on the actual violation of the provisions. But 
if the agreement is determined to reduce the market competition and lead to the 
unreasonable transportation service to reduce, increase or unreasonable 
transportation costs, the committee can only submit the case to the court according to 
the regulations and provide relevant evidence to the court. Then, the court issued an 
injunction to stop the implementation of the agreement. It should be noted that the 
act or agreement investigated by Commission, except according to court injunction 
to terminate the contract before the Committee make a decision and issued the 
relevant orders, the behaviour or the agreement is still valid (Ocean Shipping Reform 
Act of 1998, 1998). In accordance with the law, the Commission shall make a written 
report on the findings and to hold hearings. Report the findings, rulings, facts and 
final orders of the investigation and provide copies of the reports. A written report 
should be published for public understanding. 
5.5.5 The punishment system of monopolistic behaviour 
As the monopolistic behaviour in violation of the provisions of the law, the law on 
Shipping Reform of 1998 stipulated the system of punishment including 
compensation, injunction, civil punishment and other prohibited acts. 
Compensation means damages, which include compensatory damages as well as 
punitive damages. For the complainant's request, the Commission may request 
compensation for the actual damages and reasonable attorney fees of the complainant 
after the notification has been made and the hearing has been held. Actual damages 
should include loss of interest calculated at the rate of commercial interest starting 
from the damage. If the damage is caused by the exclusion and restriction of 
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competition by the associated act, the Commission may demand additional damages 
from the perpetrator. However, the total amount of compensation shall not exceed 
two times the actual damage. If the damage is caused by the offender in the rates and 
charges of unfair, unfair discrimination behaviour, then the amount of compensation 
is the difference between the victim pay rates and other shippers pay the most 
preferential rates. The injunction will be sent after the Commission's investigation 
and could be brought to court to prohibit the formation of monopolistic alliances. 
After the court hearing that the alliance has issued a ban on the conditions. The court 
will issue a temporary injunction or preliminary injunction (Ocean Shipping Reform 
Act of 1998, 1998). 
The civil penalty is the fine, which is the most important form of punishment for the 
shipping monopoly in the United States.  For general shipping violations, the fine is 
not more than $5000. For intentional violations, the maximum amount of fines will 
be raised to $25000. Moreover, if the act is a continuing offence, then daily 
violations will be considered an independent offence. Use this cumulative 
punishment system to calculate the amount of the fine. 
Of course, in addition to compensation, injunction, civil punishment of the above 
three forms of punishment, for illegal activities, the committee may also make a 
request according to the actual situation to let the party operate or not operate. 
5.6 The governance of shipping alliance monopoly in 
China 
5.6.1 China Shipping anti-monopoly Legislation 
China's current laws and regulations do not carry out separate legislation on the issue 
of shipping alliances or shipping anti-monopoly issues. In legislation, there are only 
a few references to shipping joint ventures or shipping alliances, and there is no 
specific regulation. The main legal basis of China's shipping anti-monopoly is the 
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anti-monopoly law, the international maritime regulations and the rules for the 
implementation of the international maritime regulations. 
5.6.2 The criterion of monopoly of shipping alliance in China 
Shipping monopoly must comply with the "anti-monopoly law" for the general 
provisions of monopoly identification. From Agreement constitute a monopoly 
agreement or abuse of market dominance or from operators occupation to determine 
whether it is the monopoly. 
Monopoly agreements prohibited by the antimonopoly law refer to agreements and 
actions that restrict or exclude the influence of market competition. For example, the 
price of the product is fixed, change limit, the number of products and sales of 
related market segmentation, restrictions on the improvement of production 
technology, to boycott the behaviour of transactions or agreements are a monopoly 
agreement, which will be subject to legal regulation (Chinese Antimonopoly Law, 
2007). Not all of the monopoly agreements will be banned, which will not have a 
serious effect on the restriction of competition in the relevant market, and will bring 
benefits to consumers of the agreement. If the agreement is sent in order to improve 
the production technology, product quality and market competitiveness of small and 
medium-sized enterprises, or for treatment of the economic downturn, overcapacity, 
Even if the monopoly standard is reached, the right to exemption will also be granted.  
So, from the monopoly agreement is prohibited in China and the EU banned the 
restrictive competition agreement content is quite similar, including the fixed price 
behaviour, limiting sales behaviour, market allocation behaviour of monopoly 
(Chinese Antimonopoly Law, 2007). The provisions can be found whether the 
restrained competition agreement is banned in the European Union and China's 
prohibition of monopoly agreement are to ensure fair competition in the market, to 
achieve both equity transactions, and obtain the rights monopoly exemption 
agreements restricting competition. Monopoly agreements are conducive to the 
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related products. Therefore, maintain fair market, also ensure the realization of 
market performance. 
In the anti-monopoly law enforcement, the determination of the dominant position of 
the enterprise market is mainly determined by the market share of the enterprise. The 
standard of domination of the market from the "anti-monopoly law" in view of its 
dominant position than the EU for shipping alliance standards come loose, the 
market share of more than 30% will be the European Union as a dominant position.  
Even if a single company has a minimum market share of more than 50%, it will be 
regarded as the dominant position by China's anti-monopoly law. The alliance is at 
least two or more than two enterprises cooperation, and need to make up more than 
2/3 of the market share will be recognized as the dominant position. The EU's 
demands will be more stringent and more consistent with the Harvard School's views 
and practices than banning such abuses. China combines the ideas of free 
competition advocated by the Chicago school. 
If the enterprises through mergers, equity, assets, agreements and other means to 
obtain control of the other enterprises or exert a decisive influence on other business, 
this kind of behaviour is the behaviour of concentration prohibited by the anti-
monopoly law. Once the operator has to implement centralized action, he must 
declare to the antimonopoly organ of the State Council before it can be implemented.  
The relevant agencies for the examination of concentration of business operators also 
mainly consider enterprise market share, efforts to control the consumer market and 
economic impact. Such concentration may not be banned if the concentration of 
managers will be more competitive or more in line with the public interest of the 
community. 
For the alliance between liner companies, the rules for the implementation of the 
international maritime regulations require that their agreements be filed in 
accordance with the law. Within 15 days from the date of the conclusion of the 
contract, the shipping companies participate in the alliance shall file their records 
with the Ministry of communications respectively, and the acts of the alliance that 
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have not been filed in accordance with the law will be punished by the Ministry of 
Communications. In addition, the provisions of the international shipping regula tions 
also stipulate that any agreement between the liner trade agreement, the operation 
agreement or the freight rate signed by the carrier between the international liner 
carriers and the port of China may impair the fair competition. Or in the international 
liner shipping business services related to the particular route of our port shipping 
share if a year for more than the total volume of the 30% routes, and may damage the 
fairness of the competition, the relevant department will be eligible to export its 
investigation. 
To sum up, we can see that both the standard of monopoly for general monopoly and 
the monopoly of shipping alliance are more inclined to Harvard school. The relevant 
market share in the market is mainly as a basis for judgment, and the government has 
more interference with the shipping alliance. But it also combines the view of the 
Chicago school, and also considers the factors of market performance in the 
formulation of shipping antitrust regulation. It does not regard it as a monopoly if the 
alliance help improve the market performance. 
5.6.3 The lack of antitrust regulation in China's shipping 
alliances 
(1) The definition of shipping alliance is not clear 
China's legislation on the definition of the shipping affiliation when they can be 
found in our legislation while the use of the concept of shipping pool and shipping 
alliance, but no further definition of it, this makes the public doubt in the distinction 
and contact. In addition, the joint action or agreement of the shipping joint venture 
and the shipping alliance into the scope of the operation agreement, the negotiation 
agreement is also included in the operation agreement. Negotiation agreements and 
shipping pools are essentially agreements of different nature, the former is to 
stabilize the transport capacity and freight rates, and the latter is to rationalize the 
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operation. For example, the European Union has granted the right to the antitrust 
exemption of the shipping Union, but the negotiation agreement can only apply the 
general rules of the anti-monopoly law (P. R. China Implementation Rules of 
International Shipping Ordinance, 2003). China's legislation classify the same kind 
of agreement between the above two case, and the anti-monopoly regulation of the 
two parties will be very unfavourable. 
(2) There is no uniform law enforcement agency 
From the provisions of the international maritime regulations and the rules for their 
implementation, the record of the actions or agreements of the shipping alliance shall 
be carried out by the Ministry of transport. However, the right to investigate the 
monopoly or agreement between the shipping enterprises is subject to the joint 
efforts of the transportation department under the State Council, the administrative 
department for Industry and Commerce and the pricing department.  This impedes the 
efficiency of antitrust enforcement and increase the cost of enforcing the law. 
(3) The form of punishment is too simple 
China's legislation on the shipping alliance monopoly or punishment form of 
agreement is quite vague. For violation of the relevant provisions of the act or by 
joint agreement to eliminate or restrict competition, there is only the provision done 
by the competent communications department of the State Council, the 
administrative department for Industry and commerce or the comp etent department 
to give the appropriate punishment for the action or agreement according to the 
provisions of the relevant laws and administrative regulations.  In legislation, the 
form of punishment is too simple, and the form of punishment is mainly based on 
fines. It is necessary to change the form of punishment in a variety of ways. 
(4) The system of anti-monopoly exemption has not yet been established 
China's legislation has not only made no provision for the antitrust exemption of the 
shipping alliance, but also does not specify the right of the liner trade to enjoy 
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antitrust exemption. China only provides more specific market share for the union, 
but it cannot be further investigated whether the alliance enjoys exemption. 
5.6.4 Suggestions on the establishment of anti-monopoly 
system of shipping alliance in China 
At present, China does not have any special anti-monopoly laws for shipping. It can 
only be regulated in accordance with the general provisions of the anti-monopoly law. 
However, the anti-monopoly law is a general regulation of monopolistic conduct, and 
it does not specify the special provisions which are different from the general anti-
monopoly law according to the special circumstances of the shipping market.  
Although the provisions of the international maritime transport ordinance and the 
international maritime regulations implementing rules on shipping antitrust have 
some provisions, they are incomplete in the end, and their legal effect is still lower 
than that of the general law. 
First of all, the concept of shipping alliance should be defined. Define and 
differentiate the shipping joint venture and shipping alliance. This will help the 
shipping companies to grasp the bottom line of cooperation between them, and also 
help to improve the efficiency of the monopoly regulation of the shipping joint 
venture. The behaviour of shipping alliance should be focused on its regulation, but 
the behaviour of the shipping alliance which has not reached the monopoly standard 
should be more focused on monitoring and prevention. The shipping alliance 
behaviour getting the monopoly standard should first determine whether the 
exemption conditions of the rights according to the regulations, only the shipping 
alliance or agreement in accordance with the conditions of the party can be given 
according to the provisions of the antitrust exemption qualifications, and for 
company not meeting joint monopoly exemption conditions, should punish them 
according to the law. For shipping alliances that have not yet reached a monopoly 
standard, the preparation, contents, forms, procedures and the law enforcement 
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agencies for the acceptance of the shipping agreement shall be stipulated in detail.  
The law enforcement agencies have a clear grasp of the contents of all shipping 
agreements or actions so that they can correctly control the trend of the shipping 
alliance. Monitor the market share of shipping union members. For the occasional 
alliance behaviour beyond the specified market share or due to external factors 
beyond the Union Act of market share, compared to the other yet beyond the alliance 
behaviour, law enforcement agencies should strengthen the supervision on it. A 
careful analysis of the key reasons beyond the specified market share  is essentially, 
and market share should not only as the judgment factor.  
We can draw on the experience of the United States and set up a special anti-
monopoly law enforcement agency for shipping. However, our shipping company 
have joined in some shipping alliance, so we should establish some exemption. 
Besides, there is no shipping company in America, so we should also prevent the 
overly exacting terms. To be responsible for the regulation of the union agreement or 
the conduct of the alliance of the liner companies, to receive the shipping agreement 
and to be responsible for the review. The agency implements the supervision of 
shipping alliance agreement or behaviour. The complainants based on the complaint 
or self-decide investigate the alliance behaviour suspicious. Punish illegal 
monopolistic behaviour, comprehensive supervision and management of the shipping 
alliance. 
For the establishment of China's shipping alliance antitrust regulation system, the key 
is to improve the legislation on the shipping alliance norms.  Set up antitrust 
exemption system for shipping association and special anti-monopoly law 
enforcement agency. Based on the criterion of the monopoly of the shipping alliance, 
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6 Conclusion 
From many years of operation development of the shipping market and the shipping 
companies, shipping alliance is a good choice in liner shipping market, shipping 
company can through the alliance to improve their competition in the relevant market. 
It also enables liner companies to maintain the company's operations in a global 
economic downturn, bringing many advantages to liner companies. Therefore, 
compared with the liner conference and negotiation agreement, the shipping alliance 
is more favoured by liner companies in recent years, and the global shipping alliance 
pattern is changing constantly. Even if the shipping alliance has many advantages for 
the development of the liner company, it cannot change its nature of monopoly. 
Therefore, it is very necessary for China's shipping market and liner shipping 
company to establish a shipping alliance anti-monopoly mechanism in advance. 
This paper first summarizes the history, form economic meanings of the 
development of liner alliances. Then update the shipping alliance structure, and 
analyse the governance strategy in America, European and China. Give some advice 
to legislation in China‟s governance. For the shortcomings of China's shipping 
alliance antitrust system, the author believes that we should improve the anti-
monopoly regulation of China's shipping alliance from the legislative level, the law 
enforcement level and the system level. 
This paper hopes that through the study of the antitrust regulation of the shipping 
alliance and the relevant recommendations, it will play a role in the development of 






- 62 - 
 
References 
Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, 3 (Paul S.Edelman 1998). 
P. R. China Implementation Rules of International Shipping Ordinance, 3 (Chinese Supreme 
Court 1 20, 2003). 
Chinese Antimonopoly Law, 13 (China 8 30, 2007). 
COSCO SHIPPING Logistics Co.Ltd. (2011, 4 15). Retrieved 3 21, 2017, from COSCO: 
http://www.cosco-logistics.com.cn/col/col1050/index.html 
Chen, S. (2012). On management synergy mechanisms of containerized liner shipping 
enterprise alliance. Journal of Dalian Maritime University (Social Sciences Edition), 
10-12. 
Clarksons. (2016). Shipping Intelligence Network. Retrieved 4 5, 2017, from Shipping 
Intelligence Network: https://sin.clarksons.net/ 
Ding, Y. (2003). International shipping alliance. Containerization, 1-7. 
DoeringChe, & BollhoferAndreas. (2016). A tool for calculating concentration ratios from 
large environmental. Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, 51-54. 
Dong, Y., Miaojia, L., & Xiaoning, S. (2011). Verifying liner Shipping Alliance‟s stability 
by applying core theory. Research in Transportation Economics, 15-18. 
Fang, H. (2015). Develop the shipping alliance and Gather the Concentration Ratio. CHINA 
PORTS, 43-49. 
Fusillo. (2006). Some notes on structure and stability in liner shipping. Maritime Policy, pp. 
43-58. 
Gao, W. (2012). Model of strategic shipping alliance construction. Journal of Shanghai 
Maritime University, 12-13. 
Guo, S., & Li, Q. (2014, 3 5). Research on the dynamic change of market concentration and 
its influencing factors in Chinese manufacturing industry. China shipping Intellience, 
pp. 8-12. 
Ji, & Jiang. (2016). Three alliances CEO's strategy. CHINA SHIP SURVEY, 25-29. 
Jiang, L. (2014). The Three Major Shipping Alliance Effect on Port and Its Countermeasures. 
Logistic Technology, 9-15. 
Jiang, M. (2003, 6). RESEARCH ON ASIA-AMERICA LINER COMPETE STRATEGY. 
China shipping Intelligence, pp. 1-8. 
 
- 63 - 
 
Ji-Feng, D., & Gin-Shuh, L. (2004, 7 21). Using fuzzy MCDM to select partners. Taiwan, 
China. Retrieved from www.elsevier.com/locate/ins 
Kumar, S. (1999). An analysis of its economic impact. InProceedings of the IAME 1999 
Halifax, pp. 7-29. 
Li, T. (2016, 9). The effect of oligopoly and the decomposition of economies of scale. 
Economic Survey, pp. 1-5. 
Liao, C. (2007, 4). Analysis of shipping alliances in Maritime Transport Service Industry. 
Containerzation, pp. 20-22. 
Liu, L. (2006, 10). A preliminary study on the exemption system of shipping antitrust. 
Practice in Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, pp. 8-12. 
Lv, W. (2015, 6). Analysis of the influence of China's liner shipping market structure on the 
export of maritime service trade. Science Technology and Industry, pp. 113-118. 
Neumann, G. &. (2013). Economies of scale giant container vessels to quantify. Ordnance 
Industry Automation, pp. 18-25. 
Photis, M. P. (2011, 8 6). Strategic alliances in containe r liner shipping. Rese arch in 
Transporta tion Eco nomics, p. 1. 
PUENPATOM, T. (2006, DECEMBER). THREE ESSAYS ON DEMAND FOR FREIGHT 
TRANSPORTATION. Dissertation Abstracts International, pp. 9-10. 
Rawindaran, N. (2015). Study on Economic Regulation of Collaborative Strategies among 
Container. The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics, 1-5. 
SISI. (2016). Retrieved 4 8, 2017, from SHANGHAI INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING 
INSTUTUTE: http://sisi.shmtu.edu.cn/ 
Slack, C., & McCalla. (2002). Strategic alliances in the container. Maritime Policy & 
Management, pp. 58-61. 
Song, & Panayides. (2002). A conceptual application of cooperative game. Maritime Policy 
and Management, 1-8. 
Tang, J. (2008). Theory and policy of Antitrust Economics. Traffic Construction and 
Management, pp. 80-85. 
Wang, J. (2000). Monopoly and competition of international shipping organization. China 
Maritime Weekly, pp. 18-20. 
WinstonAlbright. (2012). Management Science Modeling. U.S.A OR CANADA: SOUTH-
WESTERN CENGAGE Learning. 
 
- 64 - 
 
Wsish, R. (1992). Competition Law. London Butterworth, pp. 45-99. 
WTO. (2016). Retrieved 3 25, 2017, from WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: 
https://www.wto.org/ 
Xu, G. (2015). Economic analysis of anti monopoly law. Transport Policy, pp. 68-75. 
Xu, Zhang, & Xu. (2006). Analysis of international shipping alliance. China Water 
Transport, 203-206. 
Yang, Y. (2003, 12). A comparative study on legislative regulation of liner shipping industry. 
Shipping Range, pp. 67-73. 
Yin, M. (2015). Anti monopoly regulation of container liner shipping market based on 
market concentration. Containerization, pp. 1-4. 
Yu, S. (2005). Research on international shipping agreement organization and antitrust 
exemption system. China Shipping Law Annually, pp. 134-138. 
 
